Contingent Match Incentives Increase Donations by Anik, Lalin et al.
 
Contingent Match Incentives Increase Donations
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Anik, Lalin, Michael I. Norton, and Dan Ariely. "Contingent
Match Incentives Increase Donations." JMR, Journal of Marketing
Research (forthcoming).
Accessed February 16, 2015 1:56:54 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12557293
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contingent Match Incentives Increase Donations 
 
Lalin Anik, Duke University 
Michael I. Norton, Harvard Business School 
Dan Ariely, Duke University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lalin Anik (corresponding author) 
Post-Doctoral Fellow 
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University 
100 Fuqua Drive, Box 90120, Durham, North Carolina, USA 27708 
lalin.anik@duke.edu 
617.980.9607   2 
 
Contingent Match Incentives Increase Donations 
We propose a new means by which non-profits can induce donors to give today and commit to 
giving in the future: contingent match incentives, in which matching is made contingent on the 
percentage of others who give (e.g., “if X% of others give, we will match all donations”). A field 
experiment shows that a 75% contingent match (where matches “kick in” only if 75% of others 
donate) is most effective in increasing commitment to recurring donations. An online experiment 
reveals that the 75% contingent match drives commitment to recurring donations because it 
simultaneously provides social proof yet offers a low enough target that it remains plausible that 
the match will occur. A final online experiment demonstrates that the effectiveness of the 75% 
contingent match extends to one-time donations. We discuss the practical and theoretical 
implications of contingent matches for managers and academics. 
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Imagine making an online donation to a favorite charity; as you check out, you are given 
the option to upgrade to a recurring donation. If you are like many donors, you would be unlikely 
to make such a commitment. Now imagine that you see another message, informing you that the 
charity will match all donations made that day, if – and only if – 75% of donors agree to upgrade 
to a recurring donation. Would this type of matching incentive – what we term a contingent 
match – change your likelihood of upgrading? And if you were in this situation, what percentage 
would motivate you most? If the match were set to “kick in” if 25% of people upgraded, you 
might feel that while the match is likely to occur, the percentage being set so low indicates that 
very few people are expected to upgrade. In contrast, if the match were set at 100% of donors – 
sending a strong signal that many people are expected to upgrade – you might feel that it is 
unlikely that fully 100% of people will agree, such that the likelihood of the match occurring is 
low. In a series of experiments, we examine the efficacy of contingent matches, exploring the 
ideal value for contingent matches to prove most effective. 
What is that ideal value? One of our goals is to test different levels of contingent matches 
to find the most effective level – the level that provides sufficient social proof while remaining a 
plausible target.  Previous research on social proof – where people are presented with the 
previous behavior of others in an effort to influence their own behavior – offers some evidence 
that targets around 70-75% can be effective in motivating behavior. In field studies examining 
the impact of environmental appeals on hotel guests’ towel reuse, appeals stating that 75% of 
guests reused their towels increased towel reuse (Goldstein, Cialdini and Griskevicius 2008). In a 
study exploring the influence of social proof on voting, Gerber and Rogers (2009) showed that 
stating that 71% of citizens voted in a previous election increased voter turnout. While we 
therefore suspected that 75% might prove an effective level for contingent matches, we note two 4 
 
crucial differences between previous research on social proof and our novel intervention of 
contingent matches. First, to our knowledge, the existing social proof research presents 
retrospective norms based on other respondents’ previous behavior; both Goldstein et al. (2008) 
and Gerber and Rogers (2009) informed respondents of the percentage of others who had already 
performed the desired behavior in the past. In contrast, we explore contingent matches in 
probabilistic scenarios where the behavior of others remains uncertain: our participants are not 
presented with information about actual past behavior, but rather are asked to consider a possible 
percentage of people who may perform a behavior in the future. Second, our use of contingent 
matches also means that we are not constrained by reality as are previous investigations of social 
proof. In order to state without deception that 75% of people have engaged in a given action, 
75% of people actually have to have engaged in that action. In contrast, because contingent 
matches are probabilistic and relate to future behavior, we are free to vary the percentage (“if 
25% engaged in the action,” “if 50% engage in the action,” etc) without resorting to deception. 
These novel features of contingent matches, however, necessarily temper our ability to make 
definitive predictions about the ideal level of contingent matches, making our investigation 
somewhat exploratory. 
 
A Problem and Our Solution 
The 2011 Fundraising Effectiveness Survey Report notes that for every $5.35 received in 
donations, $5.54 was lost through donor attrition; indeed, donor attrition stands at 59% in the 
past decade, compared to an average of just 5% attrition in for-profit enterprises. The same 
report notes that acquiring new donors is at least three times as expensive as retaining an existing 
donor. As a result, nonprofits are facing a major, costly problem. In a sector where financial 5 
 
uncertainty is high, recurring donations provide continuous and consistent revenue over the long 
term. A study conducted by Target Analytics in 2009 showed that one-time donors gave an 
average gift of $64, while donors with recurring gifts gave an average of $23. While the average 
monthly giving for recurring donors is lower on a per gift basis, however, the total revenue per 
donor each year is higher due to their increased frequency of giving. The increased returns from 
recurring donors are due not only to increased giving in year one but also to their higher 
retention rates across years. As a result, converting one-time donors to recurring donors allows 
nonprofits to receive more donations in a given year and increases their likelihood of retaining 
donors in the longer term.  
How can nonprofits move donors from contributing one-time today to committing to 
recurring donations in the longer term? Despite the clear returns for recurring donations, the 
current donation models do not maximize their benefits. In most existing models for online 
donations, the donor browses the projects on the website, picks a cause, and is directed to the 
check-out page. The donor then determines the quantity and amount of donation, and makes a 
single donation. In our model, at the check-out page, the donor is incentivized to upgrade by 
contingent match incentives. Specifically, the donor is informed that his donation will be fully 
matched, but only if some percentage of donors also commit to future giving. We manipulate this 
percentage to document the percentage threshold that is most effective in inducing donors to 
upgrade to recurring donations. We also pit contingent matches (e.g., “if X% of visitors also 
upgrade to recurring donations today, we will match your donation”) against standard matches 
(“we will match your donation”). Note that the likelihood of matching actually occurring is 
always higher with standard matches, where the match is certain. However, we explored 6 
 
whether, by offering social proof and suggesting plausible targets, contingent matches might be 
more effective than standard matches. 
Why do we predict a critical mediating role for both social proof and plausibility in the 
effectiveness of contingent matches? Decades of research suggest that people’s behavior – 
particularly in ambiguous situations – is shaped by the behavior of others (Asch 1956; Cialdini 
1993; Griskevicius et al. 2006; Miller 1984; Sherif 1936). Social proof has been shown to guide 
a diverse set of actions such as helping in emergencies, littering, and recycling (Buunk and 
Bakker 1995; Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990; Latané and Darley 1968; Schultz 1999). 
Previous research suggests that consumers are sensitive to social proof when deciding to make 
one-time donations (e.g., Shearman and Yoo 2007); as a result, we expected that donors would 
also be sensitive to social proof when considering recurring donations. As described earlier, 
however, there is a critical difference between typical instantiations of social proof (“X% of 
people have engaged in the behavior”) and contingent matches (“If X% of people engage in the 
behavior”); both suggest that many people have or are expected to engage in a behavior, but the 
latter has an element of uncertainty. As a result, we predicted an important role for another 
construct: plausibility. Certainly, individual motivation is strongly influenced by plausibility that 
goals can be reached (Bandura and Schunk 1981; Fishbach and Dhar 2005; Koo and Fishbach 
2008; Zhang, Fishbach and Dhar 2007). We expected donors’ decisions to upgrade to recurring 
donations to therefore be influenced not only by social proof (where a higher percentage is 
generally better) but also by plausibility, where a percentage that is too high may seem 
unreachable. As noted above, we therefore explored the ideal value of contingent matches that 
would be most effective. 
Overview of the Studies 7 
 
  In one field and two online experiments, we assess the impact of contingent match 
incentives on donors’ likelihood of committing to recurring monthly donations and making one-
time donations. Study 1, conducted on the charity website GlobalGiving.org, varies the 
percentage of others who must commit to recurring donations in order for all donations to be 
matched, and compares the effectiveness of contingent matches to both a prompt to give and a 
standard match incentive. In Study 2, in addition to measuring likelihood of upgrading to 
recurring donations, we assess our proposed psychological mechanisms underlying the 
effectiveness of contingent match incentives: social proof and plausibility. Finally, Study 3 
examines the effectiveness of contingent matches in encouraging one-shot donations.  
STUDY 1 
  In Study 1, we explored the impact of contingent matching on donors’ willingness to 
commit to monthly recurring donations. We partnered with Global Giving, a non-profit 
organization that connects donors with grassroots projects around the world. Potential donors can 
browse and select from a variety of projects that are organized by themes such as health care, the 
environment, and education.
 Upon choosing a project, a donor can contribute any amount using a 
credit/debit card, check, PayPal, or stock transfer. 
  Donors on the website were assigned to one of seven conditions: a control condition (the 
standard Global Giving website), a prompt condition in which they were encouraged to upgrade 
to a recurring donation, a standard match condition in which they were told their donations 
would be matched, or one of four contingent match conditions in which they were told that their 
donations would be matched only if [25%, 50%, 75%, or 100%] of donors committed to 
recurring donations. As noted above, the standard match condition – which offers a certain match 8 
 
of funds – provides a conservative test of the power of contingent matching incentives, which by 
their nature are uncertain. 
Method 
The experiment was conducted on GlobalGiving.org between December 13, 2011 and 
January 23, 2012. During this period, there were 1,942 projects active on the website, which 
received 325,815 unique visitors. 
Participants. In total, we collected data from 12,769 visitors (83% from the US) to the 
GlobalGiving.org website. Global Giving did not collect age or gender, but provided us with the 
general demographics of their donors: 65% female, with the majority between the ages of 18 to 
55. 
Procedure. After browsing the projects available, donors could click on a specific project 
of interest to learn more. On this project page, they were provided with several donation amounts 
in various increments (e.g., $10, $25, $50) which varied from project to project, and an 
explanation for what each amount would fund (e.g., “$10 sends a student to school”). See 
Appendix A, Panel 1, for a sample project page. Donors clicked on one of the set amounts on the 
project page; this amount was then carried forward to the checkout page. 
The check-out page introduced donors to our experimental manipulations (see Appendix 
A, Panel 2 for the control condition; Appendix A, Panel 3 for the 75% contingent match 
condition). Donors were randomly assigned to one of seven conditions on this checkout page. 
Donors in the control condition completed the standard check-out procedure. Those in the 
prompt condition read text that encouraged them to “help make a sustained impact by upgrading 
to a monthly recurring donation.”  Those in the standard match condition read: “A generous 
anonymous donor has agreed to match 100% of new monthly donations today. Upgrade to a 9 
 
monthly recurring donation and get your donation matched!” Finally, donors in the four 
contingent match conditions read: “A generous anonymous donor has agreed to match 100% of 
new monthly donations today, but only if [25%, 50%, 75%, or 100%] of donors start a recurring 
donation today. Upgrade to a monthly recurring donation and get your donation matched!”  
Note that while the amount that donors clicked on the project page carried forward to this 
checkout page, donors were able to type in a different amount on the checkout page. As a result, 
base donation amounts were potentially influenced by our experimental manipulations; we used 
the number that donors typed into this box as our final base donation amount. On the same 
checkout screen on which they finalized their base donation amount, donors also decided 
whether or not to commit to recurring donations: a pull-down menu was set to “one-time” as the 
default, and donors could choose to change this frequency from “one-time” to “monthly 
recurring.” Our primary dependent measure was the percentage of donors who switched from a 
one-time to a monthly recurring donation. Note that recurring donations can be cancelled at any 
time.   
Results and Discussion 
A binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to predict recurring donation 
conversion rates. Our independent variable was the seven conditions and our binary dependent 
variable was whether donors upgraded to recurring donations (0 = no, 1 = yes). A test of the full 
model against a constant only model was statistically significant, such that our conditions 
impacted donors’ willingness to upgrade from one-time to monthly recurring donations, χ
2(6) = 
14.87, p = .02. The Wald criterion demonstrated that only the 75% contingent match condition 
differed from the other conditions (p = .01), as can be seen in Figure 1, where the 75% 
contingent match condition generated higher conversion than all other conditions. Indeed, not 10 
 
only did donors in the 75% contingent match condition upgrade significantly more than those in 
the control condition (M = 4.73% vs. 3.31%), t(3761) = 2.23, p = .03, the percentage of upgrades 
in the 75% contingent match condition was higher than in the standard match condition (M = 
3.08%), t(3578) = 2.54, p = .01 – despite the fact that this condition guaranteed that donations 
would be matched. In fact, upgrade rates were significantly higher in the 75% contingent match 
than in all other conditions, χ
2s > 4.96, ps < .03, except for the 100% contingent match condition 
(M = 3.77%) where the difference was only marginal, χ
2(1) = 2.16, p = .14. However, upgrade 
rates in the 100% contingent match condition were not significantly higher than those in the 
control condition, χ
2(1) = .59, p = .44. Indeed, none of the six conditions other than the 75% 
contingent match condition differed from each other, χ
2s < 2.74, all ps > .10, again suggesting 
the unique effect of this condition. 
Finally, merely prompting donors (prompt condition) to upgrade to a monthly recurring 
donation did not by itself motivate commitment to recurring donations. If anything, the percent 
of one-time donations converted to monthly recurring donations in the prompt condition (M = 
2.84%) was lower than in the control condition, though this difference was not significant, 
t(3730) = .82, p = .41.   
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
While our experimental manipulations were specifically – and successfully – targeted at 
increasing donors’ likelihood of upgrading, understanding the total financial impact of our 
interventions requires an analysis of the dollar amounts donated. Therefore, we analyzed whether 
base amounts (the amount donors entered on the check-out page) varied by condition, for both 
one-time donors and donors who upgraded to recurring donations. For base amounts for one-time 
donors, the one-way ANOVA was significant, F(6, 12330) = 2.68, p < .02 (see Table 1 for 11 
 
means). The base amount was highest in the control condition followed by the 75% contingent 
match and 50% contingent match; amounts across all conditions ranged from $34.78 to $37.83. 
For base amounts for recurring donors, the one-way ANOVA was significant, F(6, 425) = 2.78, p 
< .02 (Table 1). The base amount was highest in the 25% contingent match condition, followed 
by the 75% contingent match and 50% contingent match (ranging between $28.04 and $36.27); 
base amounts were lower in the remaining four conditions (ranging from $19.87 to $24.27). 
While donation amounts for the 75% contingent match condition were in general among 
the highest for both one-time and recurring donors, no clear picture emerges for the particular 
effectiveness of any condition in increasing donations – not surprising given that our intervention 
was targeted at the decision to upgrade. It is clear, however, that donors who gave once (M = 
$36.82, SD = 27.95) gave significantly higher amounts than those who upgraded to recurring 
donations (M = $26.65, SD = 24.26), t(12767) = 7.47, p < .001. It thus appears that donors who 
committed to recurring donations might have strategized by initially giving less. In order to 
understand the net effect of such behavior, we next examined donor retention. Approximately 23 
months after the experiment, we gathered retention rates for each of our seven conditions, 
allowing us to calculate the impact of our interventions on total donations.
1  
Overall, donors made payments for more than one year (Mmonths = 13.90, SD = 8.29). The 
one-way ANOVA across all conditions was not significant, F(6, 412) = 1.38, p = .22, and indeed 
Table 1 shows that the average retention for all conditions was roughly one year (ranging from 
15.72 months in the control condition to 11.76 months in the standard match condition). As with 
amount of recurring donations, the 50% contingent match and 75% contingent match again 
produced the second and third highest values. Thus although recurring donors gave a smaller 
                                                           
1 Due to a technical error involving donor identification numbers, we are unable to match the donor retention data 
with the original data set. 12 
 
base amount ($26.65) than one-time donors ($36.82), their average retention of more than one 
year (Mmonths = 13.90) meant that they gave an average of $370.44. These results confirm that the 
conversion from one-time to recurring donations was indeed an upgrade.  
Finally, all of the above metrics taken together allow us to calculate the overall 
effectiveness of our seven different conditions on total donations per donor (Table 1). Because 
recurring donors contributed far more than one-time donors, and because upgrade rates to 
recurring donations were significantly higher in the 75% contingent match than all other 
conditions, the 75% contingent match condition had the highest average donations per donor 
($55.78). Indeed, this figure was more than $5 higher than the next nearest condition, 25% 
contingent match ($50.66), and more than $10 higher than the condition where matching was 
guaranteed, the standard match ($42.27). Note that the effectiveness of all of our conditions 
depends on both the retention rate of donors who commit to recurring donations and the cost and 
probability of re-acquisition for one-time donors. Inherent in the positive impact of the 75% 
contingent match condition on increasing recurring donations is the reduction of the re-
acquisition costs necessary to induce one-time donors to donate again in the future. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
STUDY 2 
Study 1 provides evidence for the effectiveness of contingent match incentives in 
inducing donors to upgrade to recurring donations – particularly when 75% of donors must 
comply for contingent matches to “kick in.” Because Study 1 was a field experiment, however, 
we were unable to directly assess the role of our proposed mediators, social proof and 
plausibility. In Study 2, we conducted a controlled online experiment in which we asked 
participants to engage in hypothetical donation decisions and complete a series of items 13 
 
assessing their perceptions of social proof and plausibility. In addition, we included measures of 
two other constructs that have been shown to influence donation behavior. First, the feeling of 
making progress towards a goal has been shown to influence people’s decision to give; second, 
the feeling that one is having prosocial impact – making a difference in the lives of specific 
others – can be a driver of giving (Cryder, Loewenstein and Seltman 2013; Grant 2007). While 
these constructs play a mediating role in many charitable contexts, we expected they would play 
less of a role in our context. First, our contingent matches do not give donors a sense of progress 
because no information is provided about how close the contingent match is to “kicking in.” 
Second, research shows that feelings of prosocial impact are highest when giving to specific 
individuals and causes rather than to general causes (Aknin, Dunn, Whillans, Grant, & Norton, 
2013); in our context, donors who make the decision to upgrade to recurring donations commit to 
give to Global Giving each month, rather than to a specific beneficiary. 
  Because the prompt and standard match conditions did not increase recurring donations 
in Study 1, in Study 2 participants were assigned to one of five conditions: a control condition or 
one of four contingent match conditions: 25%, 50%, 75%, or 100%). We explored whether the 
75% contingent match incentive would again prove particularly effective in increasing recurring 
donations. We predicted that the effectiveness of contingent matches would be driven by them 
offering sufficient social proof (“many people are upgrading”) while remaining a plausible target 
(“it’s likely that the match will kick in”).  
  Finally, respondents in Study 1 were a self-selected sample who had decided to visit an 
online charitable giving website. In Study 2, we switched to an online sample from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk; while still not perfectly representative, such samples have been used 
effectively in previous research (Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011). For our purposes, this 14 
 
sample allows us to test the effectiveness of contingent matches on donations using a different 
set of participants who had not selected into a charitable giving website. 
Method 
Participants. Participants (N = 275, 64% male; Mage = 29.6, SD = 9.3) were recruited via 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk services for an experiment about decisions in return for monetary 
compensation.  
Procedure. Participants were asked to imagine they came across a project to help 
seriously ill children on the Global Giving website and that they were interested in supporting 
this cause. Participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions, modified from the text 
used in Study 1. On the same page as the project information, those in each of the four 
contingent match conditions were informed that an anonymous donor had agreed to provide 
matching funds for people who donated. They read: “If [25%, 50%, 75%, or 100%] of people 
seeing this offer agree to upgrade to a monthly recurring donation today, we will match 100% of 
your donation. For example, if you give $10 per month, we will donate an additional $10.” 
Participants in the control condition were not provided with this information (see Appendix B for 
the information provided about the charitable cause, and the wording for the 75% contingent 
match condition).  
On the next page, all participants were asked whether they would donate to this project 
(no/yes), and if yes, how much they would donate (open ended response). Participants were also 
asked whether they were willing to upgrade to a monthly recurring donation (no/yes) – our 
primary dependent measure.    
To assess social proof, participants were asked: “What percent of people who see this 
message do you think would upgrade to a monthly recurring donation?”  To measure plausibility, 15 
 
participants rated the likelihood that the project would reach its goal (1 = very unlikely to 7 = 
very likely). Last, participants completed items assessing progress, “How much progress would 
your potential donation make toward the project's goal to help children?” and perceived impact, 
“How big would your contribution be toward the project’s goal if you made a donation?”, on 7-
point scales (1 = not at all to 7 = extremely). 
Results and Discussion 
  As in Study 1, we did not have specific predictions for the base amount donated, since 
our manipulations were targeted at changing participants’ likelihood of upgrading. A one-way 
ANOVA did not approach significance, F(4, 270) = .06, p = .99; base donation amounts ranged 
from $17.16 to $18.51, and did not differ between any of the conditions (all ps > .72). 
  We conducted a logistic regression analysis to predict recurring donation conversion 
rates. Our independent variable was the information provided across five conditions and our 
binary dependent variable was whether participants upgraded to recurring donations (0 = no, 1 = 
yes). As in Study 1, our conditions impacted participants’ willingness to upgrade from one-time 
to monthly recurring donations, χ
2(4) = 17.44, p = .002. We replicated our results from the field 
study: conversion to monthly recurring donations peaked in the 75% contingent match condition 
(M = 58.2%), which was significantly different from the control condition (M = 30.9%), χ
2(1) = 
8.39, p = .004. Again replicating Study 1, upgrade rates were significantly higher in the 75% 
contingent match than in all other conditions, χ
2s > 8.28, ps < .01, except for the 100% 
contingent match condition (M = 45.45%) where the difference was only directional, χ
2(1) = 
1.79, p = .18. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 16 
 
As in Study 1, upgrade rates for the 75% contingent match condition were highest, 
followed by those in the 100% contingent match. What accounts for this pattern? Our account 
suggests that while both the 75% and 100% contingent match conditions offer social proof – 
leading to increased upgrades – the 75% contingent match will be higher in perceived 
plausibility of “kicking in” than the 100% contingent match, making the former relatively more 
effective than the latter. 
Participants’ perceptions of social proof – the percent of other people they believed 
would also convert to recurring donations – differed as a function of condition, F(4, 270) = 
10.81, p < .001. As can be seen in Table 2 (which reports both means and significance levels), 
social proof in both the 75% contingent match and 100% contingent match was significantly 
higher than in each of the other three conditions; the 75% contingent match and 100% contingent 
match did not differ. Participants’ ratings of the plausibility of the recurring donation goal being 
reached also varied by condition, F(4, 270) = 8.63.81, p < .001. Importantly, however, the 
pattern of results differed from the pattern for social proof. As Table 2 shows, ratings of 
plausibility in the control, 25% contingent match, 50% contingent match, and 75% contingent 
match did not differ from each other, but were all significantly higher than in the 100% 
contingent match condition. Taken together, these results suggest that the 75% contingent match 
condition hits a “sweet spot” where both social proof and plausibility are high. 
We next examined ratings of progress and perceived impact; for each, we observed a 
significant effect of condition, F(4, 269) = 3.32, p = .01, and F(4, 270) = 4.18, p = .003, 
respectively. Interestingly, and as can be seen again in Table 2, both progress and perceived 
impact peaked in the 75% contingent match condition, followed by the 100% contingent match  
condition.  17 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Mediation. Given that all four constructs appeared to show a particular inflection in the 
75% contingent match condition, we conducted a mediational model to assess which constructs 
served as significant mediators of the effectiveness of contingent match incentives. In these 
analyses, we include only the four contingent match incentive conditions (which are continuous) 
and omit the control condition since this condition does not include contingent incentives and is 
therefore categorically different.  
Correlational analyses revealed that the four mediators were correlated with one another, 
all rs > .27, all ps < .001. We followed the hierarchical regression procedures recommended by 
MacKinnon, Fairchild, and Fritz (2007). First, when these four variables were entered into the 
mediation model, the impact of the conditions (four group conditions) on participants’ 
willingness to upgrade to recurring donations was significantly reduced (from b = .38, SE = .13, 
p = .003, to b = .24, SE = 0.21, p = .25), as can be seen in Figure 3. The 95% bias-corrected 
confidence intervals both for the indirect effects of social proof and for plausibility excluded 
zero ([.453, .477]) and ([-.117, -.122]), respectively, indicating two significant indirect effects. In 
contrast, neither progress (b = .14, SE = 0.26, p = .59) nor perceived impact (b = .09, SE = 0.26, 
p = .73) predicted the dependent variable in our model. The 95% bias-corrected confidence 
intervals for the indirect effects of progress and perceived impact included zero ([-.093, .230]) 
and ([-.181, .218]), respectively, confirming their nonsignificant effects on recurring donations. 
Interestingly, the coefficients on progress and perceived impact are higher than the coefficient 
for social proof (bs = .14, .09, and .06) suggesting that these two mediators may have greater 
impact on average; however, the larger standard errors for these two variables compared to social 
proof (SEs = .26. .26, and .01) suggest greater heterogeneity in their impact. In summary, these 18 
 
analyses suggest that the effect of contingent match incentives on conversion to recurring 
donations is mediated in particular by social proof and plausibility.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
As can be seen comparing Figures 1 and 2, the percentage of participants who reported 
being willing to upgrade in Study 2 was far higher (range: 29.09% to 58.18%) than the 
percentage who actually upgraded in Study 1 (range: 2.79% to 4.73%), consistent with previous 
research suggesting that people overestimate their likelihood of engaging in prosocial behavior 
(Epley & Dunning, 2000). Note that the effectiveness of the 75% contingent match occurs 
independent of the actual likelihood of the goal being reached: if participants were aware of 
population base rates of compliance, then a much lower contingent match (say, 5%) might have 
been most effective in increasing compliance in Study 1 (since actual compliance ranged from 
2.79% to 4.73%), whereas a higher percentage (say, 60%) should have most effective in Study 2, 
where actual compliance ranged from 29.09% to 58.18%. Indeed, in both studies, the percentage 
of compliance even in the most effective 75% contingent match condition was well below 75%. 
Future research is needed to explore how awareness of population base rates might interact with 
ideal levels of contingent matches. In cases in which consumers are aware of the actual 
percentage of people engaging in some behavior than our participants appear to be in the domain 
of charitable giving, contingent match incentives may prove most effective when more closely 
linked to actual percentages.  
STUDY 3 
  Studies 1 and 2 document the effectiveness of 75% contingent match incentives on 
donors’ willingness to upgrade to recurring donations. In Study 3, we examine whether the 
impact of contingent matches is specific to recurring donations, or extends to a simpler decision: 19 
 
one-time donations. In an online experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions – standard match, 50% contingent match, 75% contingent match, or a control 
condition – and chose whether to keep a $.50 payment or donate it to a charitable cause.  
Method 
Participants. Participants (N = 219, 63% male; Mage = 31.3, SD = 10.0) were recruited via 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service for an experiment about decisions in return for monetary 
compensation.  
Procedure. Participants first completed an unrelated task in exchange for $1.00. They 
were then presented with the same Global Giving project used in Study 2 – helping seriously ill 
children – and randomly assigned to one of four conditions. Those in the standard match 
condition were told that an anonymous donor had agreed to provide matching funds for people 
who donated. Those in one of the two contingent match conditions were told: “We will match 
your donation today, but only if [50% or 75%] of people seeing this offer agree to donate today.” 
Those in the control condition were not provided with additional information. Next, all 
participants were given an opportunity to contribute $.50 of their earnings, and were asked 
whether they would like to donate the $.50 or keep it. Our primary dependent measure was the 
percent of people who decided to donate.     
Results and Discussion 
  We conducted a logistic regression with our four conditions as the independent variable 
and whether participants donated (0 = no, 1 = yes) as the dependent variable. The analysis 
revealed a marginally significant effect across conditions on participants’ willingness to donate, 
χ
2(3) = 6.68, p = .08. Most importantly, however, we replicated our results from Studies 1 and 2: 
participants’ willingness to donate again peaked in the 75% contingent match condition (49.1%), 20 
 
which was significantly different from the control condition (26.5%), χ
2(1) = 5.66, p = .02. 
Meanwhile, donation percentages in the standard match (33.3%) and 50% contingent match 
(31.0%) conditions were not significantly different from the control condition or from each 
other, χ
2s < .58, ps > .45. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
  Results from a field experiment on GlobalGiving.org in which donors upgraded to 
recurring donations, an online experiment in which participants reported their intention to 
commit to recurring donations, and an online experiment in which participants engaged in one-
time giving, converged to demonstrate the effectiveness of contingent matches. Informing 
potential donors that their donations would be matched if and only if 75% of other donors agreed 
to upgrade (Studies 1 and 2) or donate (Study 3) led to the highest compliance. Study 2 traces the 
effectiveness of the 75% contingent match to the fact that this inducement is high in both social 
proof and plausibility when compared with contingent matches at other percentages (25%, 50%, 
and 100%).  
Perhaps most strikingly, the 75% contingent match – an incentive that is not certain to 
“kick in” – proved to be more effective in inducing donors to upgrade than a standard match in 
which donations were guaranteed to be matched. Future research is needed to explore why 
standard matches perform relatively poorly compared to contingent match incentives. Indeed, 
previous research has offered mixed support for the effectiveness of matching donations 
(Benabou and Tirole 2006; Frey 1997; Gneezy 2003; Meier 2007). It is possible, for example, 
that one-to-one matching signals a well-funded organization that is therefore less need of 
support. If so, standard matches might diminish donors’ feeling of making a difference, a critical 
driver of giving (Cryder et al. 2013; Grant 2007).  21 
 
In the introduction, we noted a critical and potentially useful difference between social 
proof paradigms and our contingent match paradigm: whereas social proof information is based 
on the previous behavior of others (“75% of people have already voted”), contingent match 
incentives merely imply that many people are likely to engage in the behavior (“we expect that 
75% of people donating is a plausible target – or we would not have set the match at this level.”) 
Despite the fact that contingent matches do not provide evidence of actual behavior, results from 
Study 2 clearly indicate that participants inferred social proof from the signal sent by contingent 
matches. One problem facing researchers and policymakers who seek to change people’s 
behavior by invoking normative data is that such data often does not point in the right direction, 
as when policymakers wish to encourage people to vote but must admit that only 25% of people 
voted in some previous election. Contingent match incentives – which instead send a signal of 
how many people are expected to engage in some behavior – are not bound by previous actual 
behavior; as a result, they may be particularly useful to invoke in situations where the frequency 
of the desired behavior is currently low. 
  While a large body of previous research has explored the impact of one of our mediators 
– social proof – on behavior (see Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004 for a review), we introduce a 
construct that serves as a limiting factor on the effect of information about the behavior of others: 
plausibility. Specifically, we show that a 100% contingent match – where an incentive will kick 
in only if fully 100% of consumers engage in a given behavior – leads consumers to feel that the 
target is unreachable, decreasing compliance. An interesting area for future research is to explore 
whether plausibility plays a similar limiting role in prototypical social proof paradigms. Imagine 
a case in which a marketer claimed that fully 100% of consumers had engaged in some action; 
would consumers similarly begin to doubt the likelihood of this claim? Indeed, it is possible that 22 
 
one reason that 70-75% seems to be an effective norm in previous research (Gerber & Rogers 
2009; Goldstein et al. 2008) is because, like the 75% contingent match in our research, it 
provides sufficient social proof while remaining plausible. Relatedly, it would be fruitful for 
future research to explore a role for diffusion of responsibility in attenuating compliance. It is 
possible that when percentage of people expected to engage in some behavior becomes very high 
(as in the 100% contingent match condition) individual donors feel less personal responsibility to 
act themselves. Diffusion of responsibility is particularly interesting in the context of contingent 
match incentives since these incentives involve expectations of how others will behave – as in 
the classic bystander studies – and not their actual behavior. 
This discussion also raises the notion that contingent match incentives might be used 
more broadly, beyond the context of charitable donations. In fact, if anything the current 
instantiation of contingent incentives may provide a relatively conservative test: donors do not 
have any information about the behavior of other donors, and donors are fully anonymous to 
each other. Imagine instead an office manager who wants each employee in her office to get a flu 
shot. Applying contingent incentives, this office manager could inform employees that each 
employee who receives a flu shot will receive a $5 gift card to Starbucks – but that the incentive 
will double to a $10 gift card if 50% of employees receive flu shots, and quadruple to a $20 gift 
card if 100% comply. In such settings, not only could the office manager provide progress 
reports (“we are currently at 49% of employees and need just a few more for the 50% incentive 
to kick in”), but the compliance of employees could be made public, such that those employees 
who had already received flu shots could attempt to convince those who had not to comply. This 
additional public pressure might serve to enhance the effectiveness of contingent matches. In this 
case, we would again expect social proof and plausibility to play a crucial mediating role, and 23 
 
might also expect perceived progress to contribute to the effectiveness of contingent matches 
(Cryder et al. 2013). 
  Future research should also explore how contingent incentives can be used in for-profit 
contexts such as subscription services (e.g., magazines) and loyalty programs (e.g., airlines, 
hotels). Imagine an online newspaper aiming to increase loyalty that offers contingent rewards: 
“If 75% of people seeing this message sign up for annual subscriptions today, we will offer the 
first three months free.” Alternatively, for-profits could offer contingent rewards via online 
social networks such as Facebook and LinkedIn to encourage customers to reach out to their own 
networks: “If 75% of your Facebook friends purchase this app today, we will offer all of you a 
free additional app.” It is of interest to explore whether the social aspect of contingent matches – 
which we have shown are effective in prosocial domains – functions in the same manner in for-
profit settings, and whether social proof and plausibility continue to play the crucial driving 
roles.  
Conclusion 
  Non-profits that fail to convert one-time donors into recurring donors lose not only 
certain recurring revenue, but incur the inevitable costs of constant recruitment of new donors. 
We suggest, and provide evidence in Studies 1 and 2, that contingent match incentives are an 
effective and underutilized means of inducing people to become recurring donors. Indeed, as of 
November 2013, GlobalGiving.org continues to use the 75% contingency match when offering 
matching campaigns, as they continue to report that recurring donation conversion rates are 
higher than baseline. While the company did not release full financials for the increase in 
donations they experienced when implementing contingent matches, Chief Product Officer 
Kevin Conroy noted that the contingent matches allowed Global Giving to double the amount of 24 
 
money they raise through recurring donations. Moreover, we also show that contingent matches 
are effective in encouraging shorter-term, one-time donations. Particularly given that there is 
little to no cost of implementing contingent matches – in this context, they involve merely adding 
text to a standard pitch – the return on investment is clearly high. 
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TABLE 1 
Study 1: Means for Base and Total Amounts Donated, and Total Time Active across Conditions 
 
 
One-Time Donations    Recurring Donations 
   
Condition  Percent of one-
time donations  Base Amount ($)  Percent of 
upgrades  Base Amount ($)  Time Active 
(months)   Average Total ($) 
Control  96.69 
 
37.83 
(28.88)
 
3.31 
 
 24.27 
(22.13) 
 15.72 
(7.89)
  49.21 
Prompt  97.16 
 
37.18 
(27.94) 
2.84 
 
19.87 
(15.62) 
 12.91 
(8.47) 
43.41 
100% match  96.92 
 
34.78 
(26.45) 
3.08 
 
  23.64 
(22.30) 
11.76 
(8.81) 
42.27 
Group 25%  96.93 
 
36.30 
(27.88)
 
3.07 
 
  36.27 
(25.88) 
  14.02 
(8.56) 
50.66 
Group 50%   97.21 
 
37.63 
(29.10) 
2.79 
 
  28.04 
(27.79)
 
  14.90 
(7.70)
  48.24 
Group 75%  95.27 
 
37.67 
(27.93) 
4.73 
 
  29.45 
(28.68)
 
14.28 
(8.03)
  55.78 
Group 100%  96.23 
 
36.23 
(27.27)
 
3.77 
 
 24.10 
(20.74)
 
   13.57 
(8.47)
  47.19 
 
 
* Average Total ($) was calculated by adding the product of the Base Amount for One-Time Donations and the percentage of one-
time donations to the product of the Base Amount for Recurring Donations, the percentage of recurring donations, and Time Active. 
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TABLE 2 
Study 2: Means for Social Proof, Plausibility, Progress and Perceived Impact across Conditions  
 
 
Condition  Social Proof   Plausibility  Progress 
Perceived 
Impact 
 
Control  30.75% (20.00%)
 a  4.20 (1.45)
 a   3.24 (1.41)
 a   2.89 (1.27)
 a   
Group 25%   26.65% (18.19%)
 a   4.02 (1.73) 
a   2.89 (1.49) 
a   2.71 (1.41) 
a   
Group 50%    40.87% (21.59%)
 b   3.75 (1.53)
 a   2.87 (1.36)
 a   2.89 (1.40)
 a   
Group 75%  48.80% (23.17%)
 c   4.05 (1.67)
 a   3.75 (1.43)
 b   3.67 (1.56)
 b   
Group 100%  47.44% (27.45%)
 c   2.62 (1.71)
 b   3.33 (1.61)
 a   3.38 (1.63)
 b   
 
 
a,b, c Within each column, values with the same superscripts are not significantly different from 
each other.  
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FIGURE 1 
Study 1: Recurring Donation Conversion Percentages across Conditions 
 
 
Note. Values that are not significantly different are shown with the same data marker; only the 
conversion rate for the 75% contingent match condition differed from the others.   
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FIGURE 2 
Study 2: Recurring Donation Conversion Percentages across Conditions 
 
 
Note. Values that are not significantly different are shown with the same data marker; the 
conversion rate for the 75% contingent match and 100% contingent match condition differed 
from the others, but not from each other. 
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FIGURE 3 
Study 2: Results of the Mediation Analyses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown, and standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. The coefficient above the path from condition to conversion to recurring donations 
represents the total effect with no mediators in the model; the coefficient below the path 
represents the direct effect when the mediators were included in the model. Coefficients 
significantly different from 0 are indicated by asterisks (*p < .05, **p < .001), and their 
associated paths are shown by solid lines; dashed lines indicate nonsignificant paths.   
Upgrade to 
Recurring Donations 
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APPENDIX A: Study 1 
Panel 1: Screenshot of a sample project page 
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Panel 2: Screenshot of the check-out page for the control condition 
 
 
 
 
Panel 3: Screenshot of the check-out page for the 75% contingent match condition 
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APPENDIX B: Study 2 
 
 
The single page of information viewed by participants (75% contingent match condition) 
 
 
 
 
Now also imagine that the following message is displayed: 
 
 